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1. INTRODUCTION 
DAGGRE was part of a program that began in 2010 as a multi-team forecasting challenge sponsored 
by IARPA. To harness the “wisdom of crowds”, researchers built an online combinatorial prediction 
market for predicting events of interest to the U.S. intelligence community. Prediction markets have a 
long history (See Rhode & Stumpf, 2004.), and their value is described at length by Surowiecki (2004). 
The DAGGRE market possessed an interface to allow users to input probability judgments directly.  
 
In three-point elicitation (TPE) of judgment, people provide their highest realistic estimates, lowest 
realistic estimates, and best estimates of a quantity. The structured question format results in more 
accurate judgments than other formats (Speirs-Bridge et al., 2010). TPE of forecasts can have 
advantages over a market with single point elicitation, especially improvement of calibration. Soll and 
Klayman (2004) showed that intervals constructed by TPE were more likely to contain the true value 
in question. However, TPE can also have disadvantages, such as requiring more effort from 
participants. The requirement of two extra responses might discourage forecasts. However, any 
advantage one method has over the other might be shared by a hybrid method. Hence, the experiment 
described herein required that some forecasters use TPE whenever they wished to edit a market 
estimate for the first time on the DAGGRE prediction market. 
 
We expected that requiring TPE before viewing and editing of the market for an event would have the 
added advantage of increasing the diversity of opinion in the market, a major benefit according to the 
wisdom-of-the-crowd view (Surowiecki, 2004). In support of this view, Scott Page has developed 
computer models to demonstrate the benefits of cognitive diversity in group judgment (2007). 
 
We had two reasons to believe that TPE of participants prior to accessing the market history would 
improve edits to the market. The first reason, as Klayman, Soll, Juslin, et al. (2006) suggest, is that 
more samples of a person’s knowledge provide more opportunities to capture the truth. Furthermore, 
by answering several questions, a judge can assess several different hypotheses. This fits nicely with 
literature on a psychological debiasing technique called “consider-the-opposite” (Koriat, Lichtenstein, 
& Fischhoff, 1980). Several studies (e.g., Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978) point to the need for people to 
consider evidence for what initially seem like implausible outcomes. 
 
The second reason to believe that TPE would improve edits is that probability elicitation up front 
should reduce mental anchoring on any previous market estimates. Anchoring is a bias first described 
by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) that can cause irrelevant information to influence a person’s 
judgment. It is assumed that people start with implicit or explicit anchors and make incremental 
adjustments to reach their estimates. The adjustments are usually insufficient so that the anchor has 
undue influence on final estimates. Anchoring with insufficient adjustment has proven extremely 
difficult to correct (e.g., Wilson, Houston, Etling, et al., 1996). 
 
We suspected that participants in the DAGGRE market who could immediately see the estimate 
history for the probability of an event would anchor on what they saw in that history and fail to adjust 
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away from it when making their own edits. The most likely anchor seemed to be the current state of 
the market. That this is not irrelevant information is important to note. Anchoring might not 
constitute a typical cognitive bias in this situation because the anchor is potentially informative. 
 
While TPE alone might encourage more adjustments to estimates, the difficulty of avoiding anchoring 
bias indicates that a better strategy would be to remove the suspected anchor from view. Therefore, 
the experiment was designed to elicit probability estimates before participants could access the 
market history. We hypothesized that self-generated estimates would serve as reference points rather 
than the current market estimate. 
 
Combining TPE with the prediction market could generate more accurate aggregate forecasts than 
either alone. We hypothesized that people asked to do TPE would show more accurate judgment when 
they edited the market. Although their initial estimates could be extremely inaccurate, they could 
later integrate their own judgment with the market history to make edits to the market that would 
improve its overall accuracy. However, because TPE is more laborious for participants, we further 
hypothesized that it would reduce their level of participation in the market. 
2. EXPERIMENT 
Half of forecasters were randomly assigned to a new TPE interface, while the other half were assigned 
to a regular single point interface. In the TPE condition, people provided highest, lowest, and best 
estimates of the probability of the event in question. After they clicked on “Commit”, they could see 
the distribution of responses in the TPE condition and the history of market edits for the question. 
Only after entering their three-point estimate were they able to edit the market themselves. 
3. RESULTS 
Of the 1275 registrants for the TPE condition, 412 made at least one estimate on a question that had 
resolved by the close of the prediction market. 80 of the 412 made at least one edit to a question. Of 
the 1276 registrants for the regular condition, 145 made at least one edit to a question. The difference 
between the number of active participants in the TPE and regular conditions and the difference 
between the number of participants in the TPE condition who made estimates and those who made 
both estimates and edits were statistically significant. We conclude that the TPE condition typically 
increased a person’s initial participation, but ultimately decreased participation. 
 
There was a significant difference between the best estimates and first edits on a question from people 
in the TPE condition, which suggests that they were not anchoring on the state of the market when 
providing initial estimates but were moving closer to the state of the market when making edits. 
Furthermore, there was not a significant difference between the first edits of the TPE condition and 
the first edits of the regular condition, which suggests that people in the regular condition were 
responding similarly to people in the TPE condition when making edits. 
 Mean Brier Score (95% CI) 
Best of 3-Pt 0.74 (0.64, 0.84) 
Closest Regular group edit 0.69 (0.55, 0.83) 
First Edit 3-Pt group market 0.60 (0.45, 0.75) 
First Edit Regular group market 0.71 (0.60, 0.82) 
 
Table 1. Accuracy per active participant. Brier scores are similar for different types of forecasts. 
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Accuracy of responses can be assessed in two main ways: average accuracy per person in a condition 
and accuracy of an aggregated estimate over people’s responses in a condition. For the former, Table 1 
shows the means and confidence intervals of Brier scores. The similarity of results in the first two 
rows negates the possibility that people in the TPE condition were timing their estimates for when 
available information could improve their accuracy relative to estimates in the regular condition. The 
edits in the regular condition that were closest in time to the estimates in the three-point condition 
were slightly more accurate. Furthermore, as presented in the last two rows, edits from people in the 
TPE condition were more accurate that edits from people in the regular condition. Although the 
pattern of results support our hypotheses, no differences were statistically significant. 
 
For assessing the accuracy of an aggregated estimate over people’s responses, several methods were 
tried. Ultimately, the most recent estimates or edits prior to 8:30 AM each day were recorded and 
scored; the Brier scores were averaged over days and then questions. We were most interested in 
whether the edits of participants in the TPE condition would be better than the edits of participants 
in the regular condition (dashed blue line and solid red line, respectively, in Figure 1). Although they 
were all in the same prediction market, we treated the aggregated estimates in isolation. There were 
no significant differences between the conditions. 
 
Fig. 1. Average daily accuracy for three aggregation methods.  Brier scores were averaged over forecasting problems that 
resolved before the market closed. 
Because of the past success of TPE in which best estimates of people were aggregated without regard 
to time, we also explored averaging of estimates from people in the TPE condition cumulatively over 
days. This method showed only moderate accuracy, but we see that the representative dotted black 
line in Figure 1 is fairly similar to the other lines. 
 
We had hypothesized that TPE would improve the prediction market’s accuracy, but results suggest 
that after seeing the market history, people in the TPE condition behave similarly to people in the 
regular condition of the prediction market. Although we have already seen evidence that people are 
not anchoring on the state of the market when they make their edits, the typical influence of previous 
edits should not be seen as a bias because it does not decrease – and might even increase – the 
accuracy of forecasts. 
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